Collapse of the PA: Governance & Security

The potential for dismantling the Palestinian Authority (PA) seems highly unlikely considering its importance to the Israeli regime in managing and silencing Palestinians. Moreover, the international community remains committed to supporting the PA. However, if the PA were to collapse, a number of developments could unfold.
The international community, for instance, would likely see to it that the PA security forces (PASF) are remodeled as some form of internal policing unit, as stipulated in previous negotiations. It is also possible that the Israeli regime would reinstate control altogether, though this seems unlikely due to the economic cost and human resources required on Israel’s part, and from which the Oslo apparatus has so far exempted it.

In either case, Palestinian civil society would partially disintegrate, as it did during the Second Intifada. As the Second Intifada progressed, Israel succeeded in besieging former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, assassinating key leaders of different paramilitary groups, and destroying the infrastructure of the PASF. Subsequently, many members of the Fatah paramilitary forces used their weapons to expand their power and accumulate wealth, often through illegal means. Israel’s restrictions on the PASF further meant that it could not enforce public order. The disorder that gripped Palestinian society, known as falatan amni (security chaos), and the failure of the Second Intifada to achieve the political goals it sought, led the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and other leaders to demand the reinstitution of order.

The justice sector could revert to tribal and religious courts and local committees in the absence of state-sponsored institutions. Prior to the establishment of the PA, most civil matters among Palestinians were dealt with through traditional modes of dispute resolution. The justice sector as it presently exists is weak, partisan, and severely disjointed, and many civil disputes remain delegated to societal institutions, especially in areas where the PA remains absent (notably in Areas B and C of the West Bank). 

Tahani Mustafa is the Palestine analyst at the International Crisis Group, where she works on issues including security, and socio-political and legal governance in the West bank. She holds a PhD in politics and international studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. She is based between the UK, Jordan, and Palestine.

If the PA were to collapse, the international community would likely see to it that the PA security forces are remodeled as some form of internal policing unit, as stipulated in previous negotiations. The Israeli regime may reinstate control altogether, though this seems unlikely.

Latest Analysis

 Civil Society
On November 4, 2025, the UK government tabled an amendment to the Crime and Policing Bill to curtail protest rights under the pretext of “cumulative disruption.” The revised Bill is now in the House of Lords Committee, where it is scrutinized before advancing toward final approval. The amendment signals a profound shift in how the state regulates public protest. While the government presents the Bill as a neutral public order measure, it emerges directly from sustained national demonstrations for Palestinian rights and introduces new legal concepts that threaten long-established democratic freedoms. This roundtable examines the Bill’s political drivers, legal architecture, and wider implications for social movements and civil liberties in the UK. It shows that the amendment is not simply a public order measure; it is a coordinated political and legal project to narrow the space for dissent in the UK. While Palestinian solidarity is the immediate target of the crackdown on freedom of assembly, the roundtable argues that the consequences will reverberate across labor organizing, racial justice, climate activism, and broader democratic participation.
 Politics
“We’re all going to end up in Jordan,” remarked a young man from Al-Jiftlik, a Palestinian village in the Jordan Valley. His comment reflects growing despair in the West Bank countryside, where Israeli settler-colonial expansion has intensified to unprecedented levels. This is particularly true in the Jordan Valley, the agricultural heartland along the West Bank’s eastern frontier with Jordan. Once known among Palestinians as the “bride of the Jordan Valley,” Al-Jiftlik now illustrates the gravity of Israeli state-sponsored settler expansion on Palestinian land, having transformed from a prosperous agricultural community into one under siege and facing sustained displacement pressure. Since the beginning of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023, land seizure in the West Bank has shifted from creeping settler encroachment to a vicious military-backed campaign of territorial theft. This commentary shows how the Israeli regime’s land appropriation policy in the West Bank, once justified through bureaucratic-legal land seizure orders, has now increasingly shifted toward direct settler takeovers. This shift does not indicate a change in objectives but rather an escalation of existing settlement expansion mechanisms, signaling the growing power and influence of the settler movement over Israeli policy.
Al-Shabaka Fathi Nimer
Fathi Nimer· Feb 3, 2026
 Politics
The announcement of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a 15-member technocratic body chaired by Ali Shaath, signals a shift toward depoliticized governance in Gaza amid ongoing genocide. Shaath, a Palestinian civil engineer and former deputy minister of planning and international cooperation, will lead an interim governing structure tasked with managing reconstruction and service provision under external oversight. While presented as a neutral technocratic governing structure, the NCAG is more likely to function as a managerial apparatus that stabilizes conditions that enable genocide rather than challenging them. This policy memo argues that technocratic governance in Gaza—particularly under US oversight, given its role as a co-perpetrator in the genocide—should be understood not as a pathway to recovery or sovereignty, but as part of a broader strategy of genocide management.
Al-Shabaka Yara Hawari
Yara Hawari· Jan 26, 2026